

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 25

AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY
25 February 1985

Soviet Breaches of Treaty Spur Options Study

By Paul Mann

Washington—The Defense Dept. is looking at a series of options, from increased strategic forces to earlier availability of U. S. missile defense, that would counter suspected Soviet breaches of the 1972 U. S./Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty.

Also under review are possible U. S. penalties against those and other breaches. Penalties might be geared either to the technological development or to the deployment characteristics of the Soviet breach, assistant Defense secretary Richard N. Perle told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week.

He said hedges against a rapidly deployable Soviet ABM defense "run the gamut from an increase in our strategic force capability, either inside or outside existing arms control constraints, to actions that would result in improvements of our near-term deployment potential for missile defenses of our own."

Bipartisan Effort

Perle called for a bipartisan effort to end Soviet cheating. He said penalties to deny cheating's benefits to Moscow "could involve research, development or deployments that at least offset the advantage obtained by the Soviets. It need not be tit-for-tat.

"It may not suit our purposes to build a Krasnoyarsk radar in Wyoming. But we cannot continue to impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance."

A Perle aide said afterward that the phrase "inside or outside existing arms control constraints" should not be taken to mean the Defense Dept. was laying the groundwork for U. S. abrogation of the 1972 treaty. Rather, he said, the Reagan Administration is evaluating the proper course of action in view of the many arms control agreements allegedly violated by the Soviets. Violations include the radar near the city of Krasnoyarsk that the U. S. believes contravenes the 1972 ABM treaty (AW&ST Jan. 14, p. 15; Oct. 15, 1984, p. 15).

The aide said various provisions of the ABM treaty permit its amendment, renegotiation or termination if the superpowers deem their national security interests in jeopardy. "There are lots of alternatives," he said.

The Soviets claim the Krasnoyarsk installation in the central USSR is a space tracking radar that, under the ABM treaty, can be deployed anywhere inside the country (AW&ST Jan. 30, 1984, p. 60). The U. S. charges it is a large phased-array radar facing inward, usable not only for early warning but also for battle manage-

ment in a large-scale ABM system, and thus a violation.

Perle's meeting with the committee was closed to the public, but a copy of his formal statement was released, as were statements from Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and USAF Lt. Gen. John T. Chain, director of State Dept.'s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

Their statements diverged on how much U. S. security suffers from Soviet cheating. Perle claimed there are serious security risks, but Adelman said U. S. security "has not yet suffered because of Soviet noncompliance."

He added, though, that the arms control process does suffer. Chain testified that Soviet violations "call into question the important security benefits from arms control, create new security risks and undermine the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future."

The presentation to the committee came three weeks before U. S./Soviet arms reduction negotiations resume Mar. 12 in Geneva. In addition, Congress is scheduled to vote in late March on whether to release \$1.5 billion in current but frozen procurement funds for continued production of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile (AW&ST Oct. 1, 1984, p. 25). The

Administration portrays the MX as essential to its bargaining strategy in Geneva, but the House Budget Committee's chairman, Rep. William H. Gray, 3rd (D.-Pa.), suggested last week the White House might have to choose between the MX and the ballistic missile defense research program known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

When MX funding is considered in tandem with SDI, "the President may not get all of the systems that he wants," Gray said. "The choice may be between the Star Wars [SDI] system and the MX, and the question is whether or not the Administration will be able to sell to the American people as well as to the Congress that both of them are now bargaining chips. The number of chips always increases in these debates, and one is never quite sure what chip will be on the table."

He said the upcoming MX votes were too close to call in either the House or Senate.

Serious Risks

In his Senate testimony, Perle said the security risks arising from Soviet violations were particularly serious in regard to ABM defense. "The ABM treaty does not limit the production of ABM interceptor missiles, which can be deployed rather quickly. Because large radars take years to construct, the radar limitations are its core provision," he said.

Any military response to the type of potential Soviet ABM "breakouts" postulated by the intelligence community will be expensive, he said, adding: "We must have congressional support if we are to credibly threaten such a response. . . . Our ability to deal with the covert deployment scenario is even more critical because this is obviously the route the Soviets would like to use."

"It could mean reacting not only to clear evidence but also to ambiguous evidence, because such evidence would probably be the only type we would get if the Soviets chose that approach. "We have observed a pattern of Soviet conduct that indicates that they are improving their capability to deploy a nationwide ABM system," Perle testified.

Continued

Chain said the U. S. is taking Soviet violations into account in defense modernization planning, including ABM-countermeasures such as advanced penetration aids for U. S. weapons.

Regarding the Geneva talks, Chain said U. S. negotiators will raise American concerns about past and present Soviet activities, "in an effort to reverse the erosion of the ABM treaty and to seek a satisfactory outcome to our other concerns as well."

He cautioned that progress in the defense and space segment of the tripartite Geneva talks would be difficult to achieve without a satisfactory resolution of the Krasnoyarsk issue. □